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MORTGAGE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACTS AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY
D. J. FARAGE*
Various forms of emergency statutory relief have been devised during the
past few years to relieve the economic distress of debtors. One of the most common and popular devices is the legislation which, in the present emergency, has
sought to limit the amounts of deficiency judgments following mortgage foreclosures. Not that the evil sought to be remedied exists only in time of emergency, but emergencies do expose to the spotlight certain economic malpractices,
which, in more prosperous times, flourish unheeded.
At common law, a mortgage is usually mere collateral for the payment of some
primary debt. If the mortgagor should default in paying the debt, the mortgagee
might sue in personam upon the obligation. At his option, however, he might
first resort to his security on the mortgage, causing a foreclosure and sheriff's sale
of the mortgaged property. The amount realized from these proceedings, if any
remain after paying the costs and taxes, would be credited toward the unpaid obligation, and a deficiency judgment would then be rendered in the mortgagee's
favor for the balance.
The purchaser at the sheriff's sale might be a third person or the mortgagee
himself, the property going to the highest bidder. Obviously, the mortgagee
would normally not be content to permit a third person to purchase the property
at a price far inferior to the market value, and so low as to leave the amount of the
debt substantially undiminished. What is normal is, that, if a third person make
a nominal or unsubstantial bid, the mortgagee will continue to bid up the property until the price reaches the amount of the debt, or his estimate of the then
market value of the property, whichever is the lower. As a result, the mortgagee is,
more often than not, the purchaser.
All too often, especially -during depressions, when the stirring up of competitive bidding is impossible, the mortgagee, regardless of the market value of
*A.B. 1930; L.L.B. 1933 University of Pennsylvania; Prof. of Law, Dickinson School of Law,
1934-; Member of Pennsylvania Bar.
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the property, bids for the property an amount equal to the costs and taxes only.
The result is that the mortgagee gets a sheriff's deed to the property, and, in addition, since the amount of his bid was not large enough to extinguish any part of
the debt, he gets a deficiency judgment for the identical amount of the original
debt, a judgment through which he may seize any other property which the
debtor may acquire in the future. In other words, the effect of the proceedings
is, that the debtor forfeits the mortgaged property, for which he gets no credit,
and remains as liable for the original debt as he ever was.
This plight of the mortgagors is not fanciful or theoretical. During the
past few years, in Philadelphia alone, thousands upon thousands of mortgaged
properties have been acquired by the mortgagees through a nominal bid of fifty
dollars for costs. The removal of this hardship has been the aim of the Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Acts, which provide, in effect, that if the mortgagee
seeks to appropriate the mortgaged property, he is bound to credit the mortgagor
with the "fair value" of the property, which is determined through legal proceedings.
These statutes have been attacked as violating the "impairment of obligations" clause of the Federal Constitution. One of the most recent cases passing
upon this constitutional question is Beaver County Building & Loan Association
v. Winowich et ux.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with only Justice Barnes
dissenting,2 held that the act was invalid, insofar as it affected mortgages
entered into before the passage of the act.

It is well established that not all statutes which change preexisting contractual relations are violative of the "impairment of obligations" clause. The
legalistic dogma has been devised, that, changes of remedy and form are permissible, but those of substance are not. That formula the majority opinion
invokes, saying that "the change wrought by the Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency
Judgment Act is one not merely of remedy but of substance.'' 3 Like most
dogmas, this one making the formulistic distinction between remedy and
substance confuses rather than aids the solution of problems. Constitutional
lawyers know, for example, that the United States Supreme Court has held
that a legislative enactment, reducing the period of a statute of limitations
from twenty years to nine months, has been held not to impair the "obligations
of contracts" clause, even though at the end of the nine months the obligee's
cause of action was utterly destroyed.4 Apart from the fact that such a statute
iBeaver County Building & Loan Association v. Winowich et ux., 187 At.
the statute passed upon was the Act of Jan. 17, 1934 (Spec. Sess.) P.L. 243 (21
dad note, 807).
21d., 495.

31d., 491.
,Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 (1877).

481 (1936);
806

P.S., secs.
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is labeled as affecting merely the remedy, a clearer case of taking away substantial rights is hard to find.
The underlying factor which the United States Supreme Court seems to
have stressed in cases involving alleged impairments of contracts, is the reasonableness of the statute which alters prior relationships. Thus, in Home Building
& Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the court, recognizing the futility of the dogma

distinguishing remedy from substance, said, quoting from prior decisions:
"No attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between
alterations of the remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, and
those which, under the form of modifying the remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined in its own circumstances. .

.

. In all such cases, the question becomes, therefore, one

of reasonableness, and of that the legislature is primarily the judge.'' 6
As a matter of fact, the majority opinion in the W'inowich case itself
casually refers to the test of reasonableness. It is perhaps high time that it be
realized that the legalistic formula which distinguishes between remedy and
substance at best is merely descriptive of the result which the court may see
fit to reach, rather than the reason for reaching the result.
Likewise, the helpless inadequacy of broad generalizations should be
recognized, such as, that
"Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes
the intention of the parties, as evidenced by their contract, imposing
conditions not expressed therein, or dispensing with the performance
of those which are a part of it, impairs its obligation, whether the
law affects the validity, construction, duration, or enforcement of
the contract."
The statute of limitations cases 7 clcarly rebut the obvious implications
of such a generalization.
It will be noted that in the Winowich case no express provision of the
mortgage is alleged to have been impaired, but rather, that the common law
under which the mortgagor forfeited his property was impaired. It is true
that the United States Supreme Court has declared that the laws which were
m force at the time of the making of the contract enter into its obligation with
the same effect as though expressly incorporated in its terms. 8 However, a
8290 U. S. 398, 430.

6187 Ad. 481, 485, citing Story's Commentaries on the Constitution; Bk. 3, ch. 34, sec. 1379.
7Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 (1877).

SWalker v. Whitehead, 16 Wail. 314, 317; 21 L. Ed. 357; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595.
852. 858 (1934).
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literal construction of this proposition would be tantamount to freezing into
the "impairment of obligations" clause the entire body of the common law.
Such a view would raise difficult barriers before the government in any effort
to attempt social or economic reform. As a result, a corollary proposition has
Ieen advanced by the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that the "police
power" of a state is free from and paramount to the limitation of the "impairment of obligations" clauseY
Indeed, the majority opinion in the IWinowich case concedes that, in the
exercise of its "police power", a state may enact legislation which overrides
that barrier.10 However, the majority opinion denies that, "to reduce the
obligations of debtors on judgments in personam" can "be said to be an exercise
of the 'police power';' it denies that the concept of "police power" is broad
enough to include this phase of the general welfare."' It is submitted that
the majority has confined "police power" too narrowly. In Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the court said:
"The economic interests of the state may justify the exercise
of its continuing and dominant protective power, notwithstanding
interference with contract.' 2 . . . .With a growing recognition of
public needs and the relation of individual right to public security,
the court has sought to prevent the perversion of the clause through
its use as an instrument to throttle the capacity of the states to
protect their fundamental interests."' 13
It is submitted, moreover, that mortgage deficiency judgment acts are
analogous to and support the same social and economic policies as underlie
usury statutes. In both cases, the objective is to prevent the creditor from
profiting unreasonably at the expense of a helpless debtor. Yet it has been
held that a statute that makes usurious contracts void and unenforcible does
not impair the contractual rights of a creditor who entered into an usurious contract prior to the enactment of the statute. 14 How such a statute is more
properly within the "police power" of a state than a mortgage deficiency judg
ment act is difficult to understand.
SIHome Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 434, 435.
10187 Atl. 481, 494.
Id., 494.
12290 U. S. 398, 437. Italics
ours.
13Id., 444.
14Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563 (1910). Referred to in Nebbia v. New York, 291

U. S. 532, 535 (1933), for the proposition that usury laws fall within the "police power" of the
stte. See also Rowecamp et al.
v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. etal., 72 Fed. (2d.)
607; 24 L Ed. 793; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 127; 41 L. Ed. 93.
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Much is made by the majority of the argument that the statute "compels
a mortgagee to accept real estate at an appraised value in place of money";1 5
and that "the plaintiff (mortgagee) must be content with receiving only real
estate and no lawful money whatever."' 6 The source of such compulsion on
the mortgagee is difficult to trace. The statute does not oblige the mortgagee
to take the land. It merely provides, in effect, that if he chooses to proceed
against the property, rather than upon the personal obligation of the debtor,
he must account for the fair value of the property. In all such cases, the mortgagee
voluntarily and affirmatively proceeds against the land. What the mortgagee
complains of is.not that he must proceed against the land, but only that the
statute prevents him from perpetrating a heretofore legalized form of highway
robbery from the mortgagor. He wants the land, but he still wants, as far
as possible, to retain his personal claim against the debtor.
The majority further objects to the statute on the ground that "in the use
of the term 'fair value' there is introduced an indefinite and to some extent
meaningless standard . . . ..unless
the phrase 'fair value' be held to be synonymous with fair market value." 17 Yet, it has been held that, in fixing public
utility rates, "the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to
be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction
must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience
of the public."' 8 So too, in eminent domain proceedings, fair value is the
standard which determines the amount of compensation. Indeed, this standard
of fair value is no more indefinite and meaningless than the measure of damages
employed in actions for slander, libel, breach of promise, etc.
Justification is sought to be found in permitting the mortgagee to thus usurp
the debtor's property on the theory that, "even though a mortgagee obtains the
property at a cheap price, he accomplishes this . . . .in an independent capacity,
and not as mortgagee; as a purchaser, he obtained the same title as might have
been acquired by any member of the general public in competitive bidding." ' 9
It would seem that the otherwise unconscionable conduct of the mortgagee is
thus permitted to find protection behind the thin veil of the metaphysical and
legalistic theory of a separate entity. As for the argument that the mortgagor
may protect himself against thus being deprived of his property by express
stipulation in the contract,2 0 such a view ignores, from a realistic standpoint,
15187 At. 481, 490.

16Id., 485.
171d, 491.
lsSmyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 546 (1897).
19187 Ad. 481, 492.

301d, 492.

Italics ours.
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the economic bargaining inequality of the debtor, especially in times of
depression.
Perhaps the most incongruous note in the decision is sounded by Chief
Justice Kephart in his concurring opinion. He states:
"This result does not, in my judgment, prevent mortgagee debtors
from securing substantial relief in another form of procedure,
equally as beneficial as that provided by the act in question. Appellee's
counsel could have petitioned the court below to set aside the sheriff's
sale for gross inadequacy in price such as would amount in law
21
to a fraud on the debtor's right."
If, as Justice Kephart says, the mortgagee can be prevented from unconscionably
taking the debtor's property, if the right to insist on such usurpation is nonexistent, how does the statute impair his right to take the property? In a
word, the case seems to hold that the Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Act impairs
a right which the mortgagee never had. If anything, it would seem that this
argument of Justice Kephart, instead of supporting the majority opinion, discloses the weaknesses of it, and places him with the dissenting member of
the court. If Chief Justice Kephart is right, 22 thousands upon thousands ot
mortgagors, whose properties have been taken away upon nominal bids of fifty
dollars for costs only, can flood the equity courts with applications for relief.
In that event, the statute merely provides an expedient whereby such overloading
of the court lists may be avoided.
The best argument advanced by the majority is, that the act applies even
if a third party is a purchaser at a nominal bid, and that, to force the mortgagee
to credit the mortgagor's debt with the fair value of the property, under such
circumstances, might be unjust to the mortgagee. 23 From a practical standpoint, however, the answer is, that the mortgagee who is proceeding against the
land does so because he thinks it has some value. As previously indicated, the
mortgagee usually does not permit a third person to get the property through a
nominal bid. The mortgagee, in all probability, would bid up the property
to the value which he sets on the property, or the amount of the debt, whichever is the lower. In any event, even if a third person is a purchaser, there is
still the fundamental question of justice, as to whether, in order to give a creditor
such a minute part of his claim as a third party pays, after a nominal bid, the
211d., 495.
2 Compare Brotherline v. Swires et al., 48 Pa. 68 (1864) where property worth $1500 to
$1800 was sold on a $20 bid. The trial court charged that such a sale was fraudulent as a matter
of law. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the sale could be avoided only if the jury found
fraud in fact. A venire facias de novo was awarded.
28187 Ad. 481, 492.
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debtor should be forced to submit to an unconscionable preemption of his
property. Moreover, without necessarily attempting to suggest that this argument of the majority is entirely without merit, 2 ' at least it could not be controlling in the Winowich case, because the purchaser was not a third party, but the
mortgagee himself.
It will not do to dismiss the undeniable fact of the desirability of such
legislation, and to seek refuge behind the trite assertion that, while the court
should "be realistic in facing current conditions, it would be recreant to its
duty, if it sanctioned the whittling away of constitutional restrictions."'2
That
assumes the point to be proved. The answers to most constitutional questions,
and the superrefined distinctions built up by the decisions, are rarely spelled out
by the Constitution. There is, to be sure, a theoretical distinction between declaring
a statute invalid because it is unreasonable or arbitrary, on the one hand, and
declaring the law invalid because it is unwise, on the other. And, it is true that
courts consistently proclaim themselves unconcerned with the wisdom of legislative policies. But the dye of the economic, social, and political philosophies
of the members of any given court will inevitably seep from the standard of
what is unwise to color the standard of what is arbitrary. In the last analysis,
as Chief Justice Hughes once said, "we are living under a Constitution, but the
26
Constitution is what the Judges say it is."
The conflicting opinions in the Winowich case simply represent two distinct
schools of philosophy. The one is individualistic, seeking the survival of the
fittest; the other champions the theory that society is entitled to protection against
unfair individual profiteering.
It is true that the Pennsylvania decision follows the trend in most of the
other states on similar statutes, although New York has held such a statute
constitutional.27 Apart from the respect which the New York Court of Appeals merits, it might be observed that there are instances in our constitutional
24The Act might be improved by an amendment providing that, where a third person is the

purchaser, and the bid falls below the fair market value of the property, the sale may be set aside
and a new one ordered. This would be wholly in keeping with the suggestion of Chief Justice
Kephart, and would avoid the possible construction of which the present Act is capable, under
which the mortgagee would be compelled to credit the debtor with the fair value of the property,
even though a third party purchaser might have entered only a nominal bid. Another possibility
would be to provide simply that any purchase of property under foreclosure proceedings, whether
by the mortgagee or a third party, at a price below the fair market value, may be set aside and a
riew sale ordered.

25187 Ad. 481, 494.
26Pearson & Allen, The Nine Old Men, 94 (1936); E. R. Nichols, Congress or the Supreme
Court, 56 (1936).
2
7For cases holding similar acts unconstitutional, see: Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 11'
N. 3. Law 596; Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266; Kresos v. White, Superintendent of
Banks, (Ariz.) 54 P. (2d.) 800, Contra; Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144.
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history where the majority of states, agreeing on some constitutional issue,
were ultimately reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, state
workmen's compensation laws were almost unanimously declared unconstitutional
28
until the decision in the Second Employers' Liability Cases.
It might be observed, in passing, that the emphasis on emergency seems
misplaced. To be sure, the evil sought to be remedied is then more widespread.
But the utility in enforcing the salutary policy of a carefully prepared deficiency
judgment act is no more limited to times of emergency than usury statutes. It
may be wondered why such a policy should not be adopted permanently.
Whether or not unfavorable court decisions will check the effort to pass
such enactments remains for the future to reveal. Modifications of the statute.
especially concerning cases where third parties are purchasers, 29 might open the
door to a reconsideration of the constitutional issues. At any rate, until the
United States Supreme Court speaks on the subject, "hope springs eternal."
Carlisle, Pa.
December 1, 1936.
28223 U. S. 1 (1912).
29See footnote No. 24.
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